

USAWC STRATEGY RESEARCH PROJECT

IN THE AFTERMATH OF OPERATION IRAQI FREEDOM:
EUROPEAN SUPPORT FOR THE GLOBAL WAR ON TERRORISM

by

Lieutenant Colonel John Hickey
United States Army

Commander Victoria Smith
Project Adviser

This SRP is submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements of the Master of Strategic Studies Degree. The U.S. Army War College is accredited by the Commission on Higher Education of the Middle States Association of Colleges and Schools, 3624 Market Street, Philadelphia, PA 19104, (215) 662-5606. The Commission on Higher Education is an institutional accrediting agency recognized by the U.S. Secretary of Education and the Council for Higher Education Accreditation.

The views expressed in this student academic research paper are those of the author and do not reflect the official policy or position of the Department of the Army, Department of Defense, or the U.S. Government.

U.S. Army War College
CARLISLE BARRACKS, PENNSYLVANIA 17013

| Report Documentation Page | | | | Form Approved OMB No. 0704-0188 | |
|--|------------------------------------|-------------------------------------|----------------------------|--|---------------------------------|
| Public reporting burden for the collection of information is estimated to average 1 hour per response, including the time for reviewing instructions, searching existing data sources, gathering and maintaining the data needed, and completing and reviewing the collection of information. Send comments regarding this burden estimate or any other aspect of this collection of information, including suggestions for reducing this burden, to Washington Headquarters Services, Directorate for Information Operations and Reports, 1215 Jefferson Davis Highway, Suite 1204, Arlington VA 22202-4302. Respondents should be aware that notwithstanding any other provision of law, no person shall be subject to a penalty for failing to comply with a collection of information if it does not display a currently valid OMB control number. | | | | | |
| 1. REPORT DATE 18 MAR 2005 | | 2. REPORT TYPE | | 3. DATES COVERED - | |
| 4. TITLE AND SUBTITLE In the Aftermath of Operation Iraqi Freedom European Support for the Global War on Terrorism | | | | 5a. CONTRACT NUMBER | |
| | | | | 5b. GRANT NUMBER | |
| | | | | 5c. PROGRAM ELEMENT NUMBER | |
| 6. AUTHOR(S) John Hickey | | | | 5d. PROJECT NUMBER | |
| | | | | 5e. TASK NUMBER | |
| | | | | 5f. WORK UNIT NUMBER | |
| 7. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES) U.S. Army War College, Carlisle Barracks, Carlisle, PA, 17013-5050 | | | | 8. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION REPORT NUMBER | |
| 9. SPONSORING/MONITORING AGENCY NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES) | | | | 10. SPONSOR/MONITOR'S ACRONYM(S) | |
| | | | | 11. SPONSOR/MONITOR'S REPORT NUMBER(S) | |
| 12. DISTRIBUTION/AVAILABILITY STATEMENT Approved for public release; distribution unlimited | | | | | |
| 13. SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES | | | | | |
| 14. ABSTRACT See attached. | | | | | |
| 15. SUBJECT TERMS | | | | | |
| 16. SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF: | | | 17. LIMITATION OF ABSTRACT | 18. NUMBER OF PAGES 27 | 19a. NAME OF RESPONSIBLE PERSON |
| a. REPORT unclassified | b. ABSTRACT unclassified | c. THIS PAGE unclassified | | | |

ABSTRACT

AUTHOR: Lieutenant Colonel John Hickey
TITLE: In the Aftermath of Operation Iraqi Freedom: European Support for the Global War on Terrorism
FORMAT: Strategy Research Project
DATE: 18 March 2005 PAGES: 25 CLASSIFICATION: Unclassified

This paper examines U.S. policy and strategy that covers the Global War on Terrorism and ties it to European cooperation in the aftermath of Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF). Since OIF is still an ongoing campaign, it is important to view European cooperation in the context of current and future operations. In examining European cooperation, the two most prominent European alliances, the European Union (EU) and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) will be examined and contrasted to ascertain their policy and strategy focus. These alliances present interesting comparisons because the United States is an active participant in one and is often considered a fierce competitor in the other. Finally, the paper will recommend a strategy shift from military heavy “means” to a more balanced approach, using diplomatic and informational “means” to achieve the United States desired “ends”.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

| | |
|---|-----------|
| ABSTRACT..... | iii |
| IN THE AFTERMATH OF OPERATION IRAQI FREEDOM: EUROPEAN SUPPORT FOR THE GLOBAL WAR ON TERRORISM..... | 1 |
| U.S. NATIONAL INTEREST | 1 |
| U.S. POLICY & STRATEGY..... | 2 |
| IMPORTANCE OF EUROPEAN COOPERATION..... | 3 |
| EUROPEAN UNION POLICY & STRATEGY FOCUS | 3 |
| NORTH ATLANTIC TREATY ORGANIZATION (NATO) FOCUS | 6 |
| INITIAL SUCCESS IN GLOBAL WAR ON TERRORISM STRATEGY..... | 8 |
| OIF AND IMPLICATIONS ON GLOBAL WAR ON TERRORISM | 8 |
| STRATEGY ADJUSTMENTS..... | 9 |
| REASSESSING POLICY..... | 11 |
| CONCLUSION | 11 |
| ENDNOTES | 15 |
| BIBLIOGRAPHY | 19 |

IN THE AFTERMATH OF OPERATION IRAQI FREEDOM: EUROPEAN SUPPORT FOR THE GLOBAL WAR ON TERRORISM

Over the last several years, commentators have written much about the Global War on Terrorism (GWOT). Some have raised the question of whether it is really a war. They would use the dictionary definition that war is "a state or period of open and declared armed fighting between states or nations."¹ Since there are no traditional states or nations in this conflict, how can the United States declare war? The proponents for describing U.S. efforts as a war argue that it is "a struggle between opposing forces or for a particular end."² The "end" is freedom or liberty. Terrorists want to deny this "end," therefore U.S. policy is to declare war.

The Prussian philosopher of war, Carl von Clausewitz defines war as "an act of force to compel our enemy to do our will."³ He further states "war is not a mere act of policy but a true political instrument, a continuation of political activity by other means."⁴ For the purpose of this paper, Clausewitz' view best describes the situation that the United States confronts in defining this conflict as a Global War on Terrorism. Many traditional allies perceive U.S. policy as being too heavily focused on the military component. America's European allies generally agree on the policy goals of promoting democracy and freedom. Much of the international criticism has focused on the U.S. policy of using military "means" to compel the enemy, specifically the preemptive strike on Iraq. However, U.S. policy for the Global War on Terrorism is much larger than just Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF). The potential consequence of terrorists using Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) requires a balanced U.S. strategy, using all instruments of national power. European cooperation, specifically the European Union and North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), is still a key element to winning the Global War on Terrorism.

U.S. NATIONAL INTEREST

Before the role of the European Union and NATO in post war Iraq and the broader GWOT can be defined, one must first analyze U.S. global interests. In the aftermath of September 11, 2001, many argue the nation's most vital interest lies in the defense of the homeland. Others with a more liberal view would argue that it represents a fight for democracy and security for the entire world. The National Security Strategy quotes President Bush: "Our nation's cause has always been larger than our nation's defense. We fight, as we always fight, for a just peace—a peace that favors liberty."⁵ Thucydides, when discussing war, stated there are three causes: "interest, fear, and honor."⁶ Many conservative Americans believe the United States is at war because of honor. Terrorist attacked the nation on 11 September 2001 and the United States needed to retaliate to defend its honor. The problem is that many in the international community

believe the United States is at war because of self-interest; specifically the invasion of Iraq came because of its vast oil resources. The stated policy for going to war in Iraq was the danger of the potential transfer of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) to terrorists. After the U.S. backed coalition invaded Iraq and found no cache of weapons of mass destruction, the international community attacked the legitimacy of the war. Many European governments used this failure to reiterate their opposition to the original invasion. The United States has spent the last two years trying to recover from this negative information campaign.

U.S. POLICY & STRATEGY

On 20 January 2005, President Bush announced in his inaugural speech, "...survival of liberty in our land increasingly depends on the success of liberty in other lands." In the same speech he defined U.S. policy as seeking to "support the growth of democratic movements and institutions in every nation and culture, with the ultimate goal of ending tyranny in our world."⁷ This ideological policy relates directly to the American belief in freedom and liberty for all. The U.S. strategy to win the Global War on Terrorism as outlined in the National Security Strategy of the United States of America (September 2002) and further clarified in the National Strategy for Combating Terrorism (February, 2003), represents an aggressive approach to fighting this war. The President stated, "We must take the battle to the enemy, disrupt his plans and confront the worst threats before they emerge. In the world we have entered, the only path to safety is the path of action. And this nation will act."⁸

The National Security Strategy also identifies the concepts to achieve the goals. These concepts rely heavily on partnering with others: "...strengthen alliances to defeat global terrorism and work to prevent attacks against us and our friends; work with others to defuse regional conflicts; prevent our enemies from threatening us, our allies, and our friends with weapons of mass destruction..."⁹ The National Strategy for Combating Terrorism stated the objectives in the Global War on Terrorism as: "defeat terrorists and their organizations, deny sponsorship, support and sanctuary to terrorists, diminish the underlying conditions that terrorists seek to exploit, and defend U.S. citizens interest at home and abroad".¹⁰ The Secretary of Defense stated it best, when talking about the war on terror, "Victory will require that every element of American influence and power be engaged."¹¹ Is the United States using every element of national power to win the war? Should the U.S. response include more focus on the European alliances, specifically the European Union and NATO, to fight the perceived underlying causes of terrorism?

IMPORTANCE OF EUROPEAN COOPERATION

European cooperation is critical to the success of the Global War on Terrorism. The attacks on 11 September 2001 highlighted the necessity of sharing information in a timely manner. Information is critical to fighting terrorism because the other elements of national power depend on its success. If the simple questions of: when, where, why and how can not be answered, it's difficult to defend against an attack, much less defeat it. It is important to remember that many of the terrorists responsible for 11 September 2001 lived or operated in Europe. This European base was vital to their success and remains critical to terrorist networks today from a diplomatic, informational, and economic standpoint.

Europe views the Middle East as important to their security, economies and future. Over 13 million Muslims of Middle Eastern decent live in Europe.¹² Many of these Middle Easterners migrated to Europe to find economic opportunities. Most of these immigrants promote European policies that encourage support for their countries of origin.¹³ This is part of the reason Europeans view strategy for fighting terrorism differently than the United States. The European Union's foreign policy chief, Javier Solana, recently stated, "There are old wounds in some geographical regions which as long as they are not healed will continue to create a fertile ground for terrorism to develop...." He specifically cited the "Arab-Israeli" conflict.¹⁴ This view has led Europeans to focus on some of the causes of terrorisms, including poverty and job opportunities. Over the last three decades the European Union has worked to find a negotiated settlement to the Arab-Israeli conflict. The European premise is a negotiated settlement will help solve the underlying ideological and financial support for terrorism in the Middle East.

The National Strategy for Homeland Security describes the most immediate and serious threat as a "...sophisticated terrorist networks spread across many countries, linked together by far-flung networks of financial and ideological supporters, and operating in a highly decentralized manner."¹⁵ Achieving a common understanding with European allies is imperative to America's ability to gain information superiority over the global terrorist threat. Europe's location and influence in the Middle East is critical to penetrating these terrorist networks. The nature of the threat demands a comprehensive and coordinated U.S. and European strategy in the Global War on Terrorism.

EUROPEAN UNION POLICY & STRATEGY FOCUS

To understand European cooperation on the Global War on Terrorism there is not a better place to begin than with the European Union. The European Union is an alliance of 25 nations. When originally formed in May 1950, the European Union had only 6 member countries. France

proposed the European Union creation, with the stated purpose being to create an alliance to integrate Europe and prevent a repetition of World War I or World War II.¹⁶ The European Union today defines itself as "... a family of democratic European countries, committed to working together for peace and prosperity."¹⁷

To better understand the European mentality about armed conflict, one must remember that European states have been at war with one another for thousands of years. The one thing they have in common, as German military historian Han Delbruck noted, is that, "...Europe stands united in this one conviction: it will never submit to a hegemony enforced upon it by a single state."¹⁸ Delbruck's statement is significant because it depicts a strategic mindset that refuses to allow a single authority to upset the balance of power in Europe. This mindset drives the European policy as it relates to the United States.

Traditionally, the European Union focused on curbing U.S. global influence from an economic and political standpoint, while NATO worked with the United States on security cooperation. The security situation on the European continent often drove policy as it had since the rise of the Roman Empire in the third century BC and the First Punic War. The rise of Napoleon and the French Revolution reinforced this belief, and it culminated with the loss of millions in the world wars. Today, with the United States' position in the world, one can state that much of the European Union, and ultimately Europeans in general, will resist a single state imposing its will on the continent or more importantly the world. With this in mind, when developing a global information campaign, where cooperation is the key, careful consideration needs to be used in developing global rhetoric. The statement that one is "either with us or against us" is an arrogance which sabotages U.S. efforts to express its desires to the world.

The encouraging news in Europe's cooperation with the Global War on Terrorism is that the European Union's policy of promoting global peace, stability, and democracy has much in concert with the U.S. policy. On 26 June 2004, the United States and the European Union signed a formal declaration to combat terrorism. This agreement represents a comprehensive policy that includes the information, legal, intelligence, and economic elements of national power. Of the seven main points in the declaration the third point is probably the most critical. This point states, "We commit to working together to develop measures to maximize our capacities to detect, investigate, and prosecute terrorists and prevent terrorist attacks."¹⁹ This requires the United States and the twenty-six member states that are part of the European Union to share information. Sharing information is vital to preventing future terrorist attacks. The other interesting item in the declaration is the sixth point, which states "... work in close cooperation to diminish the underlying conditions that terrorists can seize to recruit and exploit

their advantage. By promoting democracy, development, good governance, justice, increased trade and freedom...²⁰ This joint declaration came only three months after terrorist attacks in Madrid, but almost three years after 11 September 2001. The logical conclusion for the delay is the European Union became interested in sharing resources only after the attack on one of its members. This attack in Spain struck close to home and threatened democracy, trade, and freedom in the minds of the Europeans. The timing in connection with the Spanish elections and targeting a major transportation hub, reinforced the seriousness of the threat. All these factors led to an agreement between the European Union and the United States to share information.

How has this declaration impacted the fight on terror? Has the United States seen any European Union support for its strategy in Iraq? Interestingly, the answer is "yes" instead of the "no" the press often reports. The published strategy of the European Union for Iraq includes three main objectives. These are "development of stable and democratic Iraq; establishment of an open, stable, sustainable and diversified market economy; Iraq's economic and political integration into its region and the open international system."²¹ The major difference between the United States and the European Union strategies has been the ways and means chosen to execute policy. The European Union has traditionally emphasized economic and diplomatic approaches in executing policy rather than military means.

In Iraq, this economic/financial emphasis is evident with the European Union pledging 1.25 billion Euro and spending 305 million Euro in 2003/2004.²² This pledge is relatively small in comparison to America's commitments, but shaped by the Europeans negative view of the Iraqi War. By contrast, the European Union delivered billions of euros to the Palestinian Authority, in the last decade to promote economic development. This demonstrates the European attempt to solve the causes of terrorism, while benefiting from the economic trade. The European Union is winning the diplomatic and informational campaign. The fruit of this labor is evident in the sale of European goods and services on the Arab streets. Its policy has assisted the European Union in establishing economic dominance in the region. The European Union is the "...biggest trading partner and donor of development assistance for nearly all the countries..." in the Arab World.²³

The latest European Union effort has been the development of a military arm, called the EU Force (EUFOR), under the auspices of European Security and Defense Policy. This military component called Eurocorps started in 1993 with initial NATO coordination. The organization's growing importance was demonstrated in 1999 when it added a crisis response capability and in 2003 when it established its deployable headquarters.²⁴ This is a clear policy shift for the

European Union, which prior to 1993 focused primarily on economic and diplomatic matters. The reason for this shift falls into two schools of thought. One school feels it represents an attempt to separate itself from a NATO dominated by the United States. The other school feels its purpose is to take more responsibility for European security matters, specifically peacekeeping missions. The truth probably falls somewhere in between. Viewing the major policy initiatives and critical conflict dates of 1993 (Bosnia-Herzegovina), 1999 (Kosovo), and 2003 (Iraq) there is a strong argument that suggests this shift resulted from disagreements between the European Union and the United States on policy, specifically when to use military force.

In the broader perspective of the Global War on Terrorism, this new peacekeeping role would be a much welcomed one, if the units assigned to EU Force (EUFOR) were not the same ones assigned to NATO. The only real difference between the European Union and NATO headquarters is the lack of U.S. participation. From a positive standpoint, this is one less mission for the United States. Additionally, it takes the burden off NATO for the same reasons. The EUFOR took over the NATO Stabilization Force (SFOR) mission in Bosnia/Herzegovina in December 2004. This action freed up some NATO staff, including U.S. personnel. The long-term implications of the European Union's expansion of its charter and what this means for NATO's future role is yet to be determined. The immediate impact in the Global War on Terrorism is that the European Union brought immediate relief for U.S. planning and manning requirements in Bosnia/Herzegovina. It has allowed NATO to focus on other areas, including Afghanistan and Iraq, if not with units, then with staffs.

NORTH ATLANTIC TREATY ORGANIZATION (NATO) FOCUS

The North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) is a civil and military organization, founded in 1949 "...to ensure that the fragile democracies of post-war Europe had a decent chance for survival."²⁵ The organization's mission was to defend Western Europe with a mainly defensive strategy and posture. The original purpose of NATO "...was to safeguard the freedom and security of all its members by political and military means..."²⁶ This is still NATO's stated policy but its success in achieving the goal of establishing "...a just and lasting peaceful order in Europe based on common values of democracy, human rights and the rule of law..." has evolved into the European Union's playing a larger role in determining European policy and security issues.²⁷ The Bosnia/Herzegovina SFOR mission and the combating terrorism declaration are two recent examples of the European Union's expanding role. The relatively

peaceful situation in Europe, since the Kosovo Air Campaign in 1999, along with the growth in size and independence of the European Union are the key enablers.

Europeans agree that their current security situation would not have been possible without the U.S. policy and strategy initiatives over the last decade. Tony Blair, the British Prime Minister, when talking about the Balkan wars in the 1990s stated, "Alliance cohesion with a strong U.S. role have given clout to our political efforts, and forced the warring factions to stop fighting and start negotiating. U.S. engagement in European security was essential to our success."²⁸ The security realities today are different. As the U.S. ambassador to NATO, R. Nicholas Burns has stated, "... if NATO is to remain the world's most effective military and political alliance, it must adapt its fundamental strategy to the realities of the post-Sept. 11 world."²⁹ In fact, NATO is changing and its support of the U.S. Global War on Terrorism policy was almost immediate after the attacks of 9/11.

On 12 September 2001, less than 24 hours after the 9/11 attacks, NATO members for the first time in history, invoked Article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty, which states "... that an armed attack against one or more NATO member countries will be considered an attack against all..."³⁰ On 4 October 2001, the alliance agreed to eight U.S. initiatives to strengthen support for the fight against terrorism. These initiatives provided immediate assistance in the fight on terror and long-term enhancements in intelligence sharing, security assistance, and increased basing and overflight options.³¹ Over the last three years, NATO policy has enabled the United States to divert forces into Afghanistan and Iraq. NATO provided direct support in the United States under Article 5 with aircraft, specifically the Airborne Warning and Control System (AWACS), to supplement U.S. forces in the United States. This allowed the diversion of these scarce assets to overseas operations in Afghanistan. After 9/11 many NATO countries, including Germany, provided security for U.S. bases overseas, relieving the burden on U.S. forces to protect these staging and training bases.

NATO has clearly expanded its strategy for the Global War on Terrorism. Since January 2002, when the UN deployed the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) to Afghanistan, it has been under NATO command. This was the first NATO operation outside the Euro-Atlantic area. The mission has grown from security assistance in the Kabul area to the entire country.³² There are definitely challenges to NATO expanding out of the Kabul area of operations, but its policy and strategy precedents are notable. At the request of the interim Iraqi Prime Minister Ilyad Allawi, NATO established a training mission in Iraq. The NATO Training Mission-Iraq is training mid and senior level Iraqi security personnel. The mission has grown from an original seventy-five personnel to its current strength authorization of three-hundred.³³ With all this

international support for the U.S. Global War on Terrorism, why does a negative information campaign continue?

INITIAL SUCCESS IN GLOBAL WAR ON TERRORISM STRATEGY

In assessing where the United States currently stands in the Global War on Terrorism, it is important to examine the early operations. The initial phase of the Global War on Terrorism to “disrupt and destroy terrorist organizations by use of direct and continuous action using all the elements of national and international power...” was most successful.³⁴ The operations in Afghanistan demonstrated the use of a balanced strategy leading an international “coalition of the willing” against the Al Qaeda and Taliban, both the terrorist organization and its state sponsor. The United States and its partners won the “war of ideas: working closely with allies, supporting moderate and modern governments, and using effective public diplomacy...”³⁵ This is evident in the UN Security Council Resolution 1368 (including the support from America’s European Allies in both the European Union and NATO) committing money and troops to Afghanistan.³⁶ There was a demonstrated use of diplomacy in working with the moderate governments in Pakistan and Uzbekistan.

The information campaign complemented the diplomatic element of U.S. power by focusing on the key slogans: “...not a war against Islam...” and “... not a war against the Afghan people...”³⁷ These slogans were credible and brought international legitimacy to the operation. The evidence of Taliban support to the Al Qaeda terrorist network and the link to the 11 September 2001 attacks provided the justification for the preemptive strikes. The United States used the international media to deliver its message or planning rationale. The humanitarian assistance mission in conjunction with Operation Enduring Freedom, is a classic example of diplomatic, economic, military, and information being fully integrated into operations supporting the U.S. objective of winning the “hearts” and “minds” of the Afghan people. Diplomacy secured the intermediate staging bases and overflight permissions; government and non-government agencies produced the supplies; the military loaded, flew, and dropped the material; the media provided positive information to the international community, which reinforced the legitimacy of the operation.

OIF AND IMPLICATIONS ON GLOBAL WAR ON TERRORISM

The integration of all elements of national power was missing in Operation Iraqi Freedom. U.S. policy in Iraq has clouded America’s broader goals in the Global War on Terrorism. Many traditional European allies and most of the Arab world view U.S. Iraqi strategy as too focused on military responses or plans. The National Security Strategy describes a cooperative effort

amongst allies in combating terrorism. This cooperative effort is missing in the Iraqi campaign. The invasion of Iraq, without support from the United Nations and the European powers, specifically France, Germany, and Russia, casts a shadow over Operation Iraqi Freedom. Prior to the war, the Europeans questioned the United States justification for invading Iraq. The fact that coalition forces found no weapons of mass destruction damaged U.S. credibility in Europe. An overwhelming majority of the European public believe that the U.S. policies on Iraqi are wrong.³⁸ This should be a concern for the United States because all of these countries are democracies. Without public support for U.S. policies in Europe and NATO, the “coalition of the willing” could quickly turn into an alliance of the few.

In fact, the support and commitment of coalition members in Iraq changed because of terrorist attacks and public opinion. The United States lost a critical European partner when Spain pulled out of the coalition after the Madrid Bombings. Other countries followed Spain including: Nicaragua, the Dominican Republic, and Honduras. The Philippines, Thailand, New Zealand, and Hungary have all pulled out for various reasons, including public opinion and the continuing threat of terrorist acts.³⁹ Reports indicate Poland, Netherlands and Bulgaria will pull out during 2005 and a senior British military official stated that his country would start pulling out at the end of 2005.⁴⁰ The latest media reports on the accidental attack by U.S. forces on the kidnapped Italian journalist could further divide the coalition if the investigation and public relations activities are not handled properly. The United States can ill afford to lose the three thousand Italian soldiers over the latest international incident.

This withdrawal of coalition support conflicts with two of the United States key National Security Strategy goals for combating terrorism: “strengthen alliances to defeat global terrorist and work with others to defuse regional conflicts.” The coalition’s initial combat success, which led to regime change, has not yet provided the international legitimacy the United States hoped to achieve in Iraq. The early mistakes in U.S. diplomacy in gaining support for the war and the intelligence failures in not finding weapons of mass destruction continue to hamper international support.

STRATEGY ADJUSTMENTS

In 2001, President Bush identified three countries as the “axis of evil” in the war on terror. They were Iraq, Iran, and North Korea.⁴¹ The news that Iran, the second “axis of evil”, is developing nuclear capabilities has presented a dilemma. What strategy should the United States use in approaching this development? The President stated, “My hope is that we can solve this diplomatically. We are working our hearts out so that they don’t develop a nuclear

weapon, and the best way to do so is to continue to keep the international pressure on them."⁴² Ironically, the Europeans are leading the diplomatic efforts in this endeavor because the U.S. does not have diplomatic ties with Iran.

The third "axis of evil", North Korea, has required a different diplomatic and informational challenge to tackle the nuclear proliferation issue. The United States is working the diplomatic effort through negotiations with a group of nations including: Russia, China, Japan, North Korea, and South Korea. This diplomatic effort has reinforced the Arab perception that the West has a double standard in dealing with the presence of WMD. The U.S. rationale for invading Iraq was the potential spread of weapons of mass destruction. The Arab question is, since North Korea has admitted that they are developing nuclear weapon capabilities, why doesn't the United States attack North Korea as they did Iraq? The evidence suggests that limited U.S. military means, especially ground troops, are driving an adjustment in U.S. strategy. The fact that the United States had to pull out forces from one "axis of evil," the Korean Peninsula, to support another, Iraq, supports this conclusion. The inability of the United States to publicly admit military limitations reinforces Arab mistrust for Western policy. The U.S. information campaign is out of sync with its slogan that "it is not a war against Islam." In the greater Global War on Terrorism this diminishes U.S. credibility and provides adversaries an opportunity to exploit this weakness.

The security situation in Iraq and an inadequate information campaign often inhibits other elements of national power from being effective. As the European Union contends, it is difficult to help in reconstruction when the "security situation continues to impose limits on all those who want to help..."⁴³ The United States has difficulty spending its allocation of reconstruction funds because of security issues, "...of the \$18.4 billion appropriated by Congress in October 2003, only \$9.6 billion were obligated and \$2.1 billion spent by mid-December 2004."⁴⁴ The United States is in the middle of this dilemma with many international organizations demanding U.S. military security while they are reducing or eliminating their presence in Iraq. The European Union is clearly benefiting from economic trade with Iraq, but is unwilling to support security requirements. The recent emphasis on training Iraqi soldiers and using economic incentives to bring security under regional control, presents the best blueprint for success.

Successful elections in Iraq and the subsequent positive media reports present a window of opportunity. European newspapers from France, Germany, Belgium, Italy, and Britain all provided positive reports on the recent elections in Iraq. Belgium's *De Standard* summed it up best, "It looked like an impossible gamble...", and yet this important step in the post-Saddam democratic process "has turned out all right."⁴⁵ The keys to free elections were the integration

and execution of all elements of national power. The United States downplayed its military presence during the elections. It relied on the interim government and Iraqi political leaders to deliver the message or information to the people. It used Iraqi and coalition security forces around the polling areas for security. The outcome was the first democratic elections in Iraq in 50 years. The news media reports of the personal stories and the people celebrating in the streets did more in one day to rebuild unity of purpose amongst our European allies than all the diplomatic efforts have done in the last year and one half.

REASSESSING POLICY

The Global War on Terrorism, specifically as it relates to European cooperation, is at an important crossroads. This war represents a number of complicated issues. There are many factors to assess, but as Clausewitz argued, "The first task, then, in planning for war is to identify the enemy's centers of gravity, and if possible trace them back to a single one."⁴⁶ It is difficult to narrow this war's center of gravity to one, but if Iraq has taught Americans anything, it is the "will of the people" still represents a crucial center of gravity for the war on terrorism. In reassessing the U.S. policy, the first question should be whether the United States is winning the information campaign in the Arab world. Is U.S. strategy creating or destroying more terrorists? The answers were negative several months ago, but recent events in Lebanon, Israel, and even Iraq suggest the tide may be turning. It is not clear whether the U.S. information strategy is creating or destroying more terrorists.

What should the United States and Europe focus on to fight the Global War on Terrorism? The European Union Secretary General for Policy and Security Javier Solana has stated, "We (Europeans) believe the problem of terrorism must be resolved not only by dealing with its effects but also by concentrating on its causes."⁴⁷ The causes of terror are many. Solving all of them would be a monumental set of tasks, but finding a common ground or starting point is not that difficult. The Arab-Israeli conflict or more specifically the Israeli-Palestinian issue appears to be an underlying problem to peace in the Middle East, at least in the Arabs' and many European minds, for the last fifty years. As the European Union Commissioner for External Relations, Chris Patten stated, "reforming the Middle East does not depend exclusively on progress in the peace process between Israel and Palestine, but it is hard to imagine the region reaching its full potential without a settlement."⁴⁸

CONCLUSION

As many in Washington, DC are coming to understand, the way to defeat global terrorism is to focus all national and international capabilities against the enemy. This is a war that

requires extensive information operations. The best information strategy is to attack Islamic extremists by reducing their support among the moderate Muslim population. To accomplish this, the United States must first win the war of ideas. Winning the war of ideas means demonstrating United States' commitment through actions that are: political, economical and educational. The United States started down the right path by attacking some of the underlying causes of terrorism. The recent elections in the occupied territories in Palestine, the cease fire between Palestine and Israel, and the successful elections in Iraq struck at the core ideology that terrorist hope to deny, freedom and liberty. As President Bush has stated, the "momentum for freedom" is now. With his speech in Brussels on 21 February 2005, discussing the American and European alliances, he noted, "The future of our nations, and the future of the Middle East, are linked -- and our peace depends on their hope and development and freedom."⁴⁹

The administration's strategy shift from military heavy "means" to a more European diplomatic approach is encouraging support for U.S. policies in Iraq and the broader Global War on Terrorism. The Iraqi elections created momentum and energized the international community. The United States built from this success by implementing an Iraqi reconstruction effort that engages all elements of national power. The Department of Defense is working diligently to transfer interagency issues in Iraq to the State Department. The newly elected Iraqi government is providing information and communicating its message to its citizens through the media. The U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) is expediting the transfer of funds to rebuild Iraq. The reconstruction efforts are focused on restoring basic necessities and schools. The labor force for reconstruction is primarily Iraqi. The United States and NATO military forces priority of effort is on training Iraqi forces to handle their own security requirements. In the broader Global War on Terrorism, the executive branch is diplomatically reaching out to the United States' traditional allies in Europe. It was no accident that the first visit abroad of the newly appointed Secretary of State, Condoleezza Rice, was to Europe and the Middle East. The press reports and publicity on the information front is positive. In the Global War on Terrorism, a U.S. strategy that balances the elements of national power ultimately enhances America's ability to gain the information superiority it needs to win the war.

As Churchill warned America in spring of 1943, "...war is full of mysteries and surprises. A false step, a wrong direction, an error in strategy, discord or lassitude among the Allies, might soon give the common enemy power to confront us with new and hideous facts."⁵⁰ As the United States saw on 9/11 the potential always exists for surprise. The last three and half years have shown the ebb and flow of coalition and alliance warfare. It is clear that Europe still

remains a critical partner in the Global War on Terrorism. The only way to preclude another attack is to obtain reliable and verifiable information. The use of Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) by terrorists presents a horrific and terrifying capability. As Americans have learned, "winning" the war means attacking the enemy before he can attack. U.S. policy that integrates all elements of national power to attack the enemy on multiple fronts and has international support will be the most effective strategy. As former Secretary of State Colin Powell stated, "We're not going to win the war on terrorism on the battlefield alone.... Good alliance relations, trade policy, energy policy, intelligence cooperation, public diplomacy, nation-building—all of these are part of our formula for victory." ⁵¹

WORD COUNT=5603

ENDNOTES

- ¹ *The New Merriam-Webster Pocket Dictionary* (New York, 1970), 565.
- ² Ibid.
- ³ *Carl Von Clausewitz, On War*, Edited and Translated by Michael Howard and Peter Paret, (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1976), 75.
- ⁴ Ibid., 87.
- ⁵ George W. Bush, *The National Security Strategy of the United States of America*, (Washington, D.C.:The White House, September 2002), 1.
- ⁶ Michael Howard, "When Are Wars Decisive," *Survival*, vol. 41, no. 1 (Spring 1999), 127.
- ⁷ George W. Bush, "Presidential Inaugural Speech," Washington D.C., January 2005; available from <<http://www.juntosociety.com/inaugural/gwbush2.html>>; Internet; accessed 24 January 2005.
- ⁸ George W. Bush, *National Strategy for Combating Terrorism*, (Washington, D.C.:The White House, February 2003), 11.
- ⁹ Bush, *The National Security Strategy of the United States of America*, 1.
- ¹⁰ Bush, *National Strategy for Combating Terrorism*, 11.
- ¹¹ Allen W. Dowd, "Different Course? America and Europe in the 21st Century," *Parameters* (Autumn 2004): 73.
- ¹² Shada Islam, "European Union's Southern Drive," *Yale Global Online*, 30 May 2003, p. 2; available from <<http://yaleglobal.yale.edu/display.article?id=1738>>; Internet; accessed 17 March 2005.
- ¹³ Ibid.
- ¹⁴ "EU's Solana says causes of terrorism need tackling"; available from <<http://www.eubusiness.com/afp/040904093239.w0fu3jty>>; Internet; accessed 1 February 2005.
- ¹⁵ George W. Bush, *National Strategy for Homeland Security*, (Washington, D.C.:The White House, July 2002), 10.
- ¹⁶ European Union, "The European Union at a Glance"; available from <http://www.eu.int/abc/index_en.htm>; Internet; accessed 24 January 2005.
- ¹⁷ Ibid.
- ¹⁸ Peter Paret, *Makers of Modern Strategy from Machiavelli to the Nuclear Age*, (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1986), 347.

¹⁹ "Text of U.S.-EU Declaration on Combating Terrorism"; available from <<http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2004/06/20040626-5.html>>; Internet, accessed 25 January 2005.

²⁰ Ibid.

²¹ European Union, "Iraq-EU Relations: A Strategy for the Medium Term"; available from <http://www.eu.int/comm/external_relations/iraq/news/ip04_723.htm>; Internet, accessed 23 September 2004.

²² Ibid.

²³ European Union, "Commission Statement on the Transfer of Power in Iraq"; available from <http://www.eu.int/comm/external_relations/iraq/news/ip04_812.htm>; Internet; accessed 23 September 2004.

²⁴ Eurocorps, "Eurocorps History"; available from <<http://www.eurocorps.org/site/index.php?language=en&content=history>>; Internet; accessed 23 September 2004.

²⁵ R. Nicholas Burns, "The War on Terror is NATO's New Focus," *International Herald Tribune*, 6 October 2004; available from <<http://www.ihf.com/articles/542089.html>>; Internet; accessed 21 December 2004.

²⁶ The NATO Handbook, "Office of Information and Press NATO," Brussels, 1999, 23.

²⁷ Ibid.

²⁸ Tony Blair, "NATO, Europe, and Our Future Security," *Royal United Services Institute*, London, 8 March 1999; available from <http://www.britainusa.com/sections/articles_show.asp?articletype=1&Article_ID=713&i...>; Internet; accessed 10 February 2005, 4.

²⁹ Burns, 1.

³⁰ NATO, "NATO's contribution to the fight against terrorism"; available from <<http://www.nato.int/terrorism/index.htm>>; Internet; accessed, 26 January 2005.

³¹ Ibid.

³² NATO, "NATO in Afghanistan"; available from <<http://www.nato.int/issues/afghanistan/index.htm>>; Internet; accessed 26 January 2005.

³³ NATO, "NATO's Assistance to Iraq," available from <<http://www.nato.int/issues/iraq-assistance/decision.html>>; Internet; accessed 18 January 2005.

³⁴ Bush, *The National Security Strategy of the United States of America*, 6.

³⁵ Ibid.

³⁶ Marianne van Leeuwen, *Confronting Terrorism European Experiences, Threat Perceptions and Policies* (The Hague: Kluwer Law International, 2003), 193.

- ³⁷ Bob Woodward, *Bush at War* (New York: Simon & Schuster, 2002), 115.
- ³⁸ Stan Crock, "If You're Not With Us...", *Business Week*, 13 September 2004, Issue 3899, 38.
- ³⁹ John Pike, "Non-US Forces in Iraq-15 January 2005," *Global Security*; available from <http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/ops/iraq_orbat_coalition.htm>; Internet; accessed 2 February 2005.
- ⁴⁰ The ideas in this sentence are based on remarks made by a speaker participating in the Commandant's Lecture Series.
- ⁴¹ "Bush: Iran Won't Have a Nuclear Weapon," *Associated Press*, 28 September 2004, available from <<http://www.cnn.com/2004/allpolitics/09/28/bush.Tuesday.ap/>>; Internet; accessed 6 October 2004.
- ⁴² Ibid.
- ⁴³ European Union, "Iraq Reconstruction: Commission Releases EUR 160 million"; available from <http://europa.eu.int/comm/external_relations/iraq/news/ip04_584.htm>; Internet; accessed 23 September 2004.
- ⁴⁴ Curt Tarnoff, "Iraq: Recent Developments in Reconstruction Assistance," *Congressional Research Service*, Report to Congress, 20 December 2004, i.
- ⁴⁵ European Press Review, "Hope for Iraq?," *Deutsche Welle*; available from <<http://www.dw-world.de/dw/article/0,1564,1474009,00.html>>; Internet; accessed 10 February 2005.
- ⁴⁶ *Von Clausewitz*, 619.
- ⁴⁷ "EU's Solana says Causes of Terrorism Needs Tackling."
- ⁴⁸ Humayun Chaudhry, "EU: 'Strategic partnership'," *Makka Times*, 19 May 04 available from <<http://english.aljazeera.net/NR/exeres/8E49A89B-64B8-403F-8D35-B21DE7B45E1E.htm>>; Internet; accessed 10 February 2005.
- ⁴⁹ Concert Noble, "President Discusses American and European Alliance in Belgium," 21 February 2005; available from <www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2005/02/20050221.html>; Internet; accessed 9 March 2005.
- ⁵⁰ Paul Kennedy, *Grand Strategies in War and Peace*, Yale University Press, London, 1992, 66.
- ⁵¹ Colonel Daniel Smith, "Spending Under Fire," *Foreign Policy in Focus*, 11 March 2004; available from <www.fpif.org/commentary/2004/0403budget_body.html>; Internet; accessed 23 September 2004.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

- "Bush: Iran Won't Have a Nuclear Weapon." *Associated Press*, 28 September 2004. Available from <<http://www.cnn.com/2004/allpolitics/09/28/bush.Tuesday.ap/>>. Internet. Accessed 6 October 2004.
- "EU's Solana Says Causes of Terrorism Need Tackling." Available from <<http://www.eubusiness.com/afp/040904093239.w0fu3jty>>. Internet. Accessed 1 February 2005.
- "Text of U.S.-EU Declaration on Combating Terrorism." Available from <<http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2004/06/20040626-5.html>>. Internet. Accessed 25 January 2005.
- European Union. "The European Union at a Glance." Available from <http://www.eu.int/abc/index_en.htm>. Internet. Accessed 24 January 2005.
- Blair, Tony. "NATO, Europe, and Our Future Security," *Royal United Services Institute*, 8 March 1999. Available from <http://www.britainusa.com/sections/articles_show.asp?sarticletype=1&Article_ID=713&i...>. Internet. Accessed 10 February 2005.
- Burns, R. Nicholas. "The War on Terror is NATO's New Focus." *International Herald Tribune*, 6 October 2004. Available from <<http://www.ihf.com/articles/542089.html>>. Internet. Accessed 21 December 2004.
- Bush, George W. *National Strategy for Combating Terrorism*. Washington, D.C.: The White House, February 2003.
- Bush, George W. *National Strategy for Homeland Security*. Washington, D.C.: The White House, July 2002.
- Bush, George W. *National Security Strategy of the United States of America*. Washington, D.C.: The White House, September 2002.
- Bush, George W. "Presidential Inaugural Speech." Washington D.C.: January 2005. Available from <<http://www.juntosociety.com/inaugural/gwbush2.html>>. Internet. Accessed 24 January 2005.
- Chaudhry, Humayun. "EU: 'Strategic Partnership'." *Makka Times*, 19 May 04. Available from <<http://english.aljazeera.net/NR/exeres/8E49A89B-64B8-403F-8D35-B21DE7B45E1E.htm>>. Internet. Accessed 10 February 2005.
- Carl Von Clausewitz, On War*. Edited and Translated by Michael Howard and Peter Paret. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1976.
- Crock, Stan. "If You're Not With Us...." *Business Week*, 13 September 2004, Iss. 3899, 38.
- Dowd, Allen W. "Different Course? America and Europe in the 21st Century." *Parameters* (Autumn 2004): 73.

- Eurocorps . "Eurocorps History." Available from <<http://www.eurocorps.org/site/inde.php?landguage=en&content=history>>. Internet. Accessed 23 September 2004.
- European Press Review. "Hope for Iraq ?." *Deutsche Welle*, Available from <<http://www.dw-world.de/dw/article/0,1564,1474009,00.html>>.Internet. Accessed 10 February 2005.
- European Union. "Commission Statement on the Transfer of Power in Iraq." 28 June 2004. Available from <http://europa.eu.int/comm./external_realtions/iraq/news/ip04_812.htm>. Internet. Accessed 23 September 2004.
- European Union. "Iraq Reconstruction: Commission Releases EUR 160 million." Available from <http://europa.eu.int/comm/external_relations/iraq/news/ip04_584.htm>. Internet. Accessed 23 September 2004.
- European Union. "Iraq: Commission Sets Priorities for Aid in 2004." 4 March 2004. Available from <http://europa.eu.int/comm./external_realtions/iraq/news/ip04_303.htm>. Internet. Accessed 23 September 2004.
- European Union. "Iraq-EU Relations: A Strategy for the Medium Term." 9 June 2004. Available from <http://europa.eu.int/comm./external_realtions/iraq/news/ip04_723.htm>. Internet. Accessed 23 September 2004.
- Islam, Shada. "European Union's Southern Drive." *Yale Global Online*, 30 May 2003, 2. Available from<<http://yaleglobal.yale.edu/display.article?id=1738>>.Internet. Accessed 17 March 2005.
- Kennedy, Paul. *Grand Strategies in War and Peace*. New Haven and London: Yale University Press,1992, 66.
- Leeuwen, Marianne Van. *Confronting Terrorism European Experiences, Threat Perceptions and Policies*. The Hague: Kluwer Law International, 2003.
- Matloff, Maurice. *Strategic Planning for Coalition Warfare, 1943-1944. United States Army in World War II: the War Department*. Washington: Office of the Chief of Military History, 1959.
- Miles, Donna. "NATO Makes Key Decisions on Iraq, Afghanistan." *American Forces Press Service*, 28 June 2004. Available from <<http://www.freerepublic.com/focus/news/1161699/posts>>. Internet. Accessed 13 September 2004.
- NATO. "NATO in Afghanistan." Available from <<http://www.nato.int/issues/afghanistan/index.htm>>. Internet. Accessed 26 January 2005.
- NATO. "NATO's Assistance to Iraq." Available from <<http://www.nato.int/issues/iraq-assistance/decision.html>>.Internet. Accessed 18 January 2005.
- NATO. "NATO's Contribution to the Fight Against Terrorism." Available from <<http://www.nato.int/terrorism/index.htm>>. Internet. Accessed 26 January 2005. Howard, Michael. "When Are Wars Decisive." *Survival* 41, no. 1 (Spring 1999): 127.

- Noble, Concert. "President Discusses American and European Alliance in Belgium." 21 February 2005. Available from <www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2005/02/20050221.html>. Internet. Accessed 9 March 2005.
- Paret, Peter. *Makers of Modern Strategy from Machiavelli to the Nuclear Age*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1986, 347.
- Pike, John. "Non-US Forces in Iraq-15 January 2005." *Global Security*. Available from <http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/ops/iraq_orbat_coalition.htm>. Internet. Accessed 2 February 2005.
- Smith, Daniel Colonel (Retired). "Spending Under Fire." *Foreign Policy In Focus* 11 March 2004. Available from <http://www.fpif.org/commentary/2004/0403budget_body.html>. Internet. Accessed 23 September 2004.
- Tarnoff, Curt. "Iraq: Recent Developments in Reconstruction Assistance." *Congressional Research Service, Report to Congress*. 20 December 2004.
- The NATO Handbook. "Office of Information and Press NATO." Brussels, 1999, 23.
- The New Merriam-Webster Pocket Dictionary. NY: G. & C Merriam Co., 1970.
- Weigley, Russell F. *The American Way of War*. Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1973.
- Woodward, Bob. *Bush at War*. New York: Simon & Schuster, 2002.

